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AND CRIMINOLOGY 
ANTHONY WALSH AND CODY JORGENSEN 
INTRODUCTION: CRIMINOLOGY NEEDS 
AN ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE 
............ .. ............ .. ....................................... ............ ..... ........ ... .... ........ ...... .... ... ....................... .. .... .... ... ................. ... .... 
IN this chapter, we (a) demonstrate the relevance of evolutionary theory to criminology, 
(b) discuss the evolutionary origins of both prosocial and antisocial traits, and (c) show 
that evolutionary theory is invaluable to understanding two key issues that have been 
impervious to solution using the standard social science model-the sex ratio in crimi-
nal offending and the age-crime curve. 
Evolutionary criminology is part of a broader biosocial approach to criminology that 
includes genetics and neurobiology in addition to evolutionary theory (Walsh & Beaver, 
l009). Whereas genetic and neurobiological approaches are finding relatively wide-
spread acceptance (Cooper, Walsh, & Ellis, 2010), with many books devoted to them, 
the evolutionary approach to criminology is barely acknowledged, currently with only 
two books devoted exclusively to it (Durrant & Ward, 2015; Roach & Pease, 2013). This 
is unfortunate because evolutionary theory can serve as a meta-theory for criminol-
ogy and all other social sciences because of "its potential to tie together the forest of 
hypotheses about human behavior now out there" (de Waal, 2002, p. 187). Tooby and 
Cosmides (2005) agree, arguing that evolutionary psychology can coherently integrate 
all the human sciences: 
Evolutionary psychology is the long-forestalled scientific attempt to assemble out of 
the disjointed, fragmentary, and mutually contradictory human disciplines a single, 
logically integrated research framework for the psychological, social, and behavioral 
sciences-a framework that not only incorporates the evolutionary sciences on a full 
and equal basis, but that systematically works out all of the revisions in existing belief 
and research practice that such a synthesis requires. The long-term scientific goal 
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toward which evolutionary psychologists are working is the mapping of our univer-
sal human nature. (p. 5) 
Criminology is certainly in need of an organizing principle to bundle its stew of contra-
dictory theories into a relatively orderly package. Cooper and colleagues' (2010) study 
asking criminologists to identify the theory they believed accounted for the most var-
iance in serious criminal behavior identified no less than 24 (and there are many oth-
ers), with self-identified political ideology (conservative, moderate, liberal, and radical) 
being far the best predictor of the theories they chose. We do not claim that accepting an 
evolutionary approach (one not limited only to evolutionary psychology) will lead to an 
explosion of new criminological evidence as did, for example, the acceptance of atomic 
theory for chemistry in the 19th century (Knight, 1992). Rather, evolutionary analyses 
will add layers of new understanding to what we already know and will open up avenues 
to explore novel vistas. 
Evolutionary criminology utilizes a Darwinian framework to animate its research 
agenda. Its vocabulary contains many biological terms, but it is "environmentally 
friendly" because it recognizes that pressures from the social environment formed 
a good part of the human genome. Evolutionary explanations of behavior differ from 
genetic explanations: Geneticists focus on differences among people and ask proximate-
level "how" questions, whereas evolutionists focus on human similarities and ask 
ultimate-level "why" questions. For instance, a proximal explanation for sex difference 
in aggression may appeal to different testosterone levels, whereas evolutionary scientists 
would explore the adaptive rational for why sex differences in testosterone levels exist 
in the first place. Because evolved adaptations apply to all members of a species, unlike 
geneticists, evolutionary criminologists search for environmental sources of variation in 
criminal behavior. However, they readily acknowledge variation in human traits distrib-
uted around adaptive means, but their concern is central tendency rather than variation. 
Many criminologists have an aversion to evolutionary thinking because it engages 
their naive fear ofbiology. Cooper et al. (2010) found that the modal number of biology 
classes taken by the 770 criminologists they surveyed was zero. This apparently reflects 
a belief that human behavior can be understood by appealing only to the environmen· 
tal portion of the biosocial whole and that culture puts humans above biology. Such an 
attitude is scientifically indefensible. Humans are certainly unique in many ways, but so 
is every other animal species in one way or another. The attitude that humans !ire so spe-
cial that they are set above nature and require a different set of ontological principles to 
understand their behavior delays progress in the human sciences. Human nature is the 
sum of human adaptations forged by the mechanisms of evolution-natural selection, 
sexual selection, mutation, genetic drift, and gene flow. An understanding of the adapt· 
ive significance of human nature's component parts forged by these processes should be 
fundamental to all branches of human science; models of human behavior without such 
information are incomplete. 
Criminologists may also discount evolutionary theory because it is not shy about 
revealing the "dark" side of human nature, and in this sense it is "politically incorrect." It 
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talks about reproductive success as the ultimate goal of all sexually reproducing animals 
and lays bare the aggression, deceptiveness, and egoism that have evolved as aids in pur-
suing it (mating effort). But other more positive human characteristics, such as altruism, 
nurturance, and empathy, have also evolved because they equipped us with parental 
skills (parenting effort) and valuable social skills as well. In The Descent of Man, Charles 
Darwin wrote about cooperation three times more often than he wrote about competi-
tion (Barrett, 2016; Levine, 2006). But it is negative traits that most interest criminolo-
gists, whose stock in trade is vice, not virtue. 
EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR 
We can think of the difference between mainstream criminology and evolutionary 
criminology as analogous to the difference between geography and geology. Geography 
describes the shape and location of the land (topography) as it presently exists, whereas 
geology looks beneath the surface to explain the processes that shaped it (plate tectonics 
and so forth). Evolution has likewise shaped the behavior and psychology of humans 
in adaptive (purpose-serving) ways, so biosocial criminologists hold it evident that it is 
crucial to look below the surface of behavior. Social scientists acknowledge that human 
anatomical and physiological features were selected over alternate designs because it 
best served some function that assisted the proliferation of genes underlying those fea-
tures, and they are thus geologists of the body. However, most social scientists would 
probably dismiss the idea that behavior is also the product of the same evolutionary pro-
cesses, and they are thus content to be geographers of the mind. 
We are not disparaging geography while endorsing geology; there is much overlap in the 
two disciplines. Geology focuses on the physical features of the earth and is more closely 
aligned with physics. Geography has a broader perspective (What is the social, political, 
and economic impact of a specific environmental policy?), combines the natural and social 
sciences, and is more closely aligned with biology. Geography departments offer courses in 
evolutionary geography- how geography has shaped things such as human culture. In this 
sense, we would very much like to see criminologists become "geographers of the mind:' 
Commenting on mainstream social science's refusal to examine the adaptive signif-
icance of human behavior, Kenrick and Simpson (1997) state that "to study any animal 
species while refusing to consider the evolved adaptive significance of their behavior 
would be considered pure folly . . . unless the species in question is Homo sapiens" 
(p. 1). Alcock (2001) makes a similar point: "To say that human behavior and our other 
attributes cannot be analyzed in evolutionary terms requires the acceptance of a gen-
uinely bizarre position, namely, that we alone among animal species have somehow 
managed to achieve independence from our evolutionary history" (p. 223). In addi-
tion, Plomin, DeFries, Craig, and McGuffin (2003) assert that "the behavioral geno-
mic level of analysis may be the most appropriate level of understanding for evolution 
because the functioning of the whole organism drives evolution. That is, behavior is 
520 ANTHONY WALSH AND CODY JORGENSEN 
often the cutting edge of natural selection" (p. 533). Without an evolutionary under-
standing, there is no scientific way to determine how a particular behavioral trait 
might have served the goal of enhancing survival and/or reproductive success over the 
course of time and how it can be coopted to serve other purposes, including criminal 
purposes (Durrant & Ward, 2012) . 
Some social scientists might take the position that although the human behavioral 
repertoire must have been designed by natural selection, evolved behaviors lost their 
relevance once we developed culture: "The beginning of mankind's psychosocial devel-
opment represents the end of biological evolution" (Ruffie, 1986, p. 297). Ruffie does not 
specify what environmental pressures resulting from our "psychosocial development" 
might have led to the elimination of alleles underlying evolved behavioral traits that 
have supposedly been rendered irrelevant. Unless evolved traits become detrimental to 
survival and reproductive success, the genes underlying them will remain in the human 
gene pool. This does not mean that evolutionary criminologists consider culture unim-
portant in explaining human behavior, although they do not view it as a realm decou-
pled from biology. Evolutionists simply ask us to remember that "psychology underlies 
culture and society, and biological evolution underlies psychology" (Barkow, 1992, 
p. 635). It is true that the fine nuances of life are edited out as we move from proximate-
level to ultimate-level explanations, but ultimate-level explanations complement proxi-
mate explanations; they do not compete with them. 
Contrary to Ruffie's (1986) puzzling contention that culture ended biological evo-
lution, culture actually gave it a gigantic boost. Sophisticated gene technology has 
revealed that the rate of genomic change has been approximately 100 times greater dur-
ing the past 40,000 years than it was during most of the Pleistocene due largely to the 
greater challenges posed by living in ever larger social groups: "The rapid cultural evo-
lution during the Late Pleistocene created vastly more opportunities for further genetic 
changes, not fewer, as new avenues emerged for communication, social interaction, and 
creativity" (Hawks, Wang, Cochran, Harpending, & Moyzis, 2007, p. 20757). 
Culture drives selection not only for psychological and behavioral traits but also for 
morphological changes. A number of studies of hominid crania dating as far back as 
1.9 million years show more robust increases in cranial capacity in areas with greater 
population density and in colder and most northerly areas of the world in whlch food 
procurement was most problematic (Ash & Gallup, 2007; Kanazawa, 2008). Bailey and 
Geary (2009) found that latitude was strongly related to cranial capacity (r;:: .61), but 
population density was more strongly related (r = .79), and concluded that the burden 
of evolutionary selection has moved from "climactic and ecological to social" (p. 77). In 
many ways, the human brain is an artifact of culture because culturally created environ-
ments have influenced both the anatomy and the physiology of the human brain above 
and beyond the influences posed by the challenges of the physical environment (Mithen 
& Parsons, 2008). Even today, new genetic variations affecting the brain's structure and 
function have been discovered as it continues to evolve in response to new ecological 
and social conditions (Evans et al., 2005; Mekel-Bobrove et al., 2005; Zhang, Landback. 
Vibranovski, & Long, 2011). 
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It must be stressed that we are adapted to seek the immediate means of achieving spe-
cific goals, not ultimate ends. As Daly and Wilson (1988) state, "Fitness consequences 
are invoked not as goals in themselves, but rather to explain why certain goals have 
come to control behavior at all, and why they are calibrated in one particular way rather 
than another" (p. 7). Humans are designed to satisfy proximate goals, which is why we 
use the phrase adaptation executors (acting in ways that would have maximized fitness 
in ancestral environments but not necessarily today) rather than fitness maximizers to 
refer to the evolved behavioral goals of modern humans. 
When we have sex, for instance, we seek the pleasurable means by which reproductive 
success may be achieved, not reproductive success per se. In pre-contraceptive times, 
there was a tighter fit between means of satisfying proximate goals (sexual pleasure) and 
means of satisfying ultimate evolutionary goals (reproduction). Similarly, parents nur-
ture and love their children because ancestral parents who did so saw more of them grow 
to reproductive age and pass on the genes underlying the traits than did parents practic-
ing less solicitude. The neurohormonal substrates of nurturing behavior are adaptations 
because they solved a recurring adaptive problem-the survival of offspring. Parents 
who neglected or abused their children compromised their viability and thus the proba-
bility of their genes being represented in future generations. The love and nurturance of 
offspring increase the probability that parental genes will survive across the generations, 
but in no sense can this distal consequence be construed as parents' proximal motiva-
tion for lavishing love and care on their children. 
THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL TRAITS 
The probability of survival and reproductive success of individuals increases in propor-
tion to the degree to which they are able to harmoniously adjust themselves to their fel-
low humans and to their environment by developing appropriate approach-avoidance 
behaviors. But as the classic (and evolutionary) view of human nature has it, humans 
are designed to maximize their pleasure and to minimize their pain. This design feature 
of human nature can disrupt relationships with others when we place immediate con-
cerns for gratification above the maintenance of social harmony and seek "money with-
out work, sex without courtship, and revenge without court delays;' to use Gottfredson 
and Hirschi's (1990, p. 89) words. Seeking needs and wants this way is what we call 
criminal. The traits that lead people down such dark roads are not traits that criminals 
possess and the rest of us lack; they are part of a universal human repertoire (would-
n't we all like "money without work;' etc.?) . We are all at risk for crossing the line from 
pro- to antisocial behavior given adequate provocation; it is simply that criminals rou-
tinely cross the threshold at lower levels of instigation. Criminals discount the delicate 
balance of the approach-avoidance imperative for a variety of reasons, such as being 
low on self-control, empathy, and fear and/or being high on aggression, callousness, 
and lust. 
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Criminal behavior is normal behavior engaged in by normal individuals. If this is so, 
the potential for it is in us all, and it must have conferred some evolutionary advantage. 
It is the traits underlying criminal behavior, not the specifics of criminal behavior (or of 
any other social behavior for that matter), that are the alleged adaptations. These traits 
are typically used illegitimately by individuals who, for whatever reason, cannot attain 
status and the resources that come with it legitimately. In other words, like all behavior 
linked to survival and reproductive success, the same traits can be used legitimately or 
illegitimately contingent upon many factors both internal and external to the actor. 
Criminologists are increasingly finding that all traits associated with criminal behav-
ior are substantially heritable (Barnes, Beaver, & Boutwell, 2011; Bentley et al., 2013) and 
are even zeroing in on specific genes associated with those traits (Beaver, Wright, & 
Walsh, 2008; Ferguson, 2010). Given this, we have to ask why genes promoting such 
traits exist. The human genome is the chemical archive of accumulated wisdom that 
has survived millions of years of ruthless selective retention and elimination of genes. 
Genes exist in the gene pool of any species because they somehow conferred an adapt-
ive advantage on ancestral organisms, suggesting that genes underlying traits associated 
with criminal behavior have survived because they served some evolutionary purpose. 
Behaviors motivated by a particular trait may be morally repulsive, but the trait is never-
theless "natural" (the product of nature) rather than pathological. 
These traits may lead to certain behavioral strategies that may be either pro- or anti-
social depending on how they were shaped in the past by cues in an individual's envi-
ronment (Wiebe, 2012). There is also considerable heritable variation in these traits that 
place individuals at risk for criminal behavior, which is likely preserved by balancing 
selection processes such as heterozygote advantage and negative frequency-dependent 
selection. Balancing processes maintain rare alleles in a population's gene pool when 
they have higher adaptive value than alternatives (Boutwell et al., 2015; Penke, Dennisen, 
& Miller, 2007). Heterozygote advantage occurs in situations in which the fitness value 
of a person with two different alleles (Aa) is greater than the fitness value of an individ-
ual with homozygous alleles (either AA or aa). This causes the retention of the alleles 
in the population regardless of differing fitness values of AA and aa alleles. In negative 
frequency-dependent selection, the fitness of a phenotype increases when it is rare and 
decreases when it becomes more common (Andres et al., 2009). 
Judith Harris (1998) speculates about the evolutionarily relevant advantages of cer-
tain traits in ancient hunter-gatherer leaders that are also useful for criminals: 
Almost all the characteristics of the "born criminal" would be, in watered-down 
form, useful to a male in a hunter-gatherer society and useful in his group. His lack 
of fear, desire for excitement, and impulsiveness made him a formidable weapon 
against rival groups. His aggressiveness, strength, and lack of compassion enable 
him to dominate his groupmates and give him first shot at hunter-gatherer perks. 
(pp. 299-300) 
These perks were those most pertinent to survival and reproductive success-resources 
and women. Females would have been attracted to such men, not because they were 
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sensitive "nice guys" but because they had high status and resources within the group 
and were good protectors and women who mated with such men would have enjoyed 
increased fitness (Buss, 2005). The traits described by Harris can overshoot their opti-
mum and become liabilities, which is often the case when exercised too freely in mod-
ern evolutionarily novel societies. 
These traits may also have been liabilities in small ancestral groups roaming the 
savanna if they led to exploitation because counteracting human competitive and status-
striving motives is a powerful egalitarian instinct (Gavrilets, 2012; Rogers, Deshpande, 
& Feldman, 2011). When Hominids branched off from the ancestral primate line dur-
ing the Plio-Pleistocene Epoch, they faced an ecology that exerted pressure for strong 
norms of reciprocal altruism. The nomadic lifestyle characterized by dangerous and 
uncertain prospects of obtaining survival resources probably kick-started the evolution 
of our species' powerful egalitarian instincts balancing out, but not eliminating, the evo-
lutionarily more ancient primate behavioral patterns rooted in status competitions and 
dominance (Adkins & Guo, 2008; Charlton, 1997 ). 
Foraging and hunting and gathering demanded strict group-wide cooperation, and 
scarce resources would have been distributed according to egalitarian principles lest 
the group fall into fractious disputes. In small hunter-gatherer groups, resource shar-
ing would have taken place under the vigilant eyes of all in immediate time (as opposed 
to a delayed-time share of society's resources in agrarian and industrial societies). All 
band members would have demanded an equal share of the pie, leaving little, if any, 
room for exploitation, and perceptions of unequal distribution would have produced 
immediately adverse emotional reactions. It would still be the case that certain skills-
hunter, speaker, fighter, peacemaker, strategist, and so on-would have conferred status 
on a person, and thus increased the person's fitness, but status would have been freely 
conferred based on meritocratic principles and subject to withdrawal if the person took 
what group members considered to be unfair advantage (Adkins & Guo, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the traits Harris (1998) alludes to as advantageous in securing resources 
and mates legitimately can be put to illegitimate use. Even criminals are constrained to 
cooperate with their conspecifics most of the time, but due to other traits they may pos-
sess, such as low self-control, low empathy, and low fear, they may default on the norms 
of reciprocity when opportunities arise. Although there are far more opportunities 
to exploit fellow humans today, there have always been individuals we refer to as psy-
chopaths, perhaps genetically maintained by one of the balancing selection processes 
referred to previously. Those who have commented on the trademark behavior of such 
people in classical, biblical, and medieval works recognized the same traits (impulsively 
self-serving and callous yet charming) in them as we do today (Hare, 1996). Aristotle 
wrote of men with a "brutish nature" arising from "reasons of injuries to the system, by 
reason of acquired habits, and by reason of originally bad nature" (as quoted in McKeon, 
1947, p. 453). Even in cultures resembling ancient hunter-gatherer groups such as the 
Inuit that demand strong norms of cooperation, people recognize psychopathic indi-
viduals, whom the Inuit call kunlangeta, who repeatedly lie, steal, freeload, and "take 
advantage of many women" (Murphy, 1976, p. 1026). 
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ALTRUISM AND CRIMINALITY 
.... ... .. ................ .. ................... ... ...... ... ... .. .. .. .. ....... ......... .... .... ... ........ .. ..... .. ..... ... ... ... .... ... .... ... .... ..... ......... ....... .. ............ 
Altruism is an active regard for the well -being of another and is the epitome of proso-
cial behavior. In many ways, it is the polar opposite of criminality-an active concern 
only for the self at the expense of others. Social life, as Plato and Freud as well as other 
lesser known luminaries have told us, is often a hedonic tug-of-war when the desire to 
expeditiously meet our wants and needs conflicts with the norms of cooperation. We 
desire both our pleasures and the good will of others, so most of us seek our pleasures in 
socially approved ways: "money from work, sex through courtship, and revenge deliv-
ered by the courts:' Although criminal activity is not uncommon, H. sapiens is a species 
with "minds [that] are exquisitely crafted by evolution to form cooperative 
relationships built on trust and kindness" (Allman, 1994, p.14). These relationships lead 
to altruistic behavior, and from an evolutionary standpoint, we have to understand 
altruism in order to understand criminality. 
A requisite condition for tit-for-tat reciprocity to be a stable strategy is frequent asso-
ciation and the ability to recognize reciprocators and non-reciprocators. Because of 
the mutual benefits of reciprocal altruism that accrue to all socially interacting species, 
altruism and cooperation have been strongly favored by natural selection. Although 
individual organisms are adapted to act in ways that tend to maximize their own fitness, 
not necessarily for the good of the group, their fitness goals are best realized by adher-
ing to the rules of cooperation and altruism-by "being nice" -and that is for the good 
of the group. Altruists recoup the costs of extending benefits and cooperation to others 
many times over, so altruism is thus ultimately self-serving, but this observation does 
not diminish the value of altruism to its beneficiaries. 
However, reciprocal altruism cannot explain situations in which individuals confer 
some benefit on strangers with no expectation of reciprocity. The phrase "psychological 
altruism" has been coined to distinguish this kind of altruism (Kruger, 2003) . If recipro-
cal altruism is a gene-based adaptation, perhaps psychological altruism is an exaptation 
seized upon by natural selection to improve upon the operation of reciprocal altruism by 
infusing it with additional neurohormonal mediators. Psychological altruism is moti-
vated by internal rewards such as guilt reduction or the joy experienced when beneficia-
ries express their gratitude for the benefactor's largesse (Brunero, 2002). Brain imaging 
studies consistently show that our pleasure centers "light up" when giving or· receiving 
something valued, but brain areas associated with the pleasures of social attachments 
only fire when giving (Mollet a!., 2006) . We act altruistically because we tend to feel 
good when we do so and because such behavior confers social status on us by identify-
ing us as persons who are kind, reliable, and trustworthy. In the ultimate sense, we do 
so because our distant ancestors who were altruistic and cooperative enjoyed greater 
reproductive success than those who were not. Possessing the neural architecture that 
produces rewarding feelings when we do good deeds for others is part and parcel of that 
adaptation (Barkow, 1997). 
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Selfishness in the evolutionary sense is morally neutral because biologists recognize 
that all sexually reproducing organisms have evolved to be concerned with their own 
survival and reproduction and will do what they must to realize those concerns (Tang, 
2010). Selfishness as understood in the vernacular means a crabbed, spiteful, egoism 
stripped of any concern for the well-being of others. Such selfishness is ultimately mala-
daptive, which is hardly self-serving. Selfishness properly understood is the most adapt-
ive of traits because it is precisely by cooperating and being actively concerned for others 
that we best serve our own interests. As Edward 0. Wilson (1978) stated, 
Human beings appear to be sufficiently selfish and calculating to be capable of 
infinitely greater harmony and social homeostasis. This statement is not self-
contradictory. True selfishness, if obedient to the other constraints of mammalian 
biology, is the key to a nearly perfect social contract. (p. 157) 
If you help another person in need, it is altruism regardless of whether it lights up your 
pleasure center, gains you brownie points with God, puffs up your chest, or enhances 
your status in the group. If one insists that psychological altruism is not "real" altruism 
because it is not entirely selfless, one is unwittingly asserting that "real" behaviors are 
ineffable, biology-free, and cannot evolve. 
All nontrivial behavior has to be anirnilted by something, and altruistic acts are typically 
animated by experiencing empathy. Empathy channels altruism in social species without 
undue reliance being placed on cognitive ruminations about such things as reciprocity 
concerns. Empathy is the cognitive and emotional ability to understand the feelings and 
distress of others as if they were our own. The cognitive component allows us to under-
stand the distress of others and why they are feeling it, and the emotional component 
allows us to "feel" that distress. To the extent that we feel empathy for others, we have an 
evolved visceral motivation to take some action to alleviate the distress of others if we are 
able. Altruism can thus be thought of as the co-evolved action component of empathy. The 
basis of empathy is the distress we feel personally when witnessing the distress of others, 
and if we can alleviate the distress of others, we thereby alleviate our own. Thus, empathy 
also has a selfish component, which is very good because if we were lacking in emotional 
connectedness to others, we would be callously indifferent to their needs and suffering. 
Frans de Waal (2oo8) posits that empathy is an ancient phylogenetic capacity pre-
dating the emergence of H. sapiens and evolved rapidly in the context of parental care. 
Empathy is an integral component of the love and nurturing of offspring. Caregivers 
must quickly and automatically relate to the distress signals of their offspring. Parents 
who were not alerted to or who were unaffected by their offspring's distress signals or by 
their smiles and cooing are surely not among our ancestors. Like the diffusion of adapt-
ive love and care of offspring to the non-adaptive love and care of the children of others 
and to pets, the capacity for empathetic responses, once locked into the human reper-
toire, diffused to a wider network of social relationships. It is the relative lack of empa-
thy that allows criminals to exploit others for their own ends (Keysers & Gazzola, 2014; 
Walsh & Vaske, 2015). 
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COOPERATION CREATES NICHES 
FOR CHEATS 
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Because cooperation occurs among groups of reciprocal altruists, it creates niches for 
cheats, who typically have low levels of empathy and altruism, to exploit (Durrant & 
Ward, 2015). It has been proposed that the stronger the selection for altruism in a spe-
cies, the more vulnerable it becomes to "Machiavellian intelligence" (Runciman, 2005, 
p. 132). Cheats are individuals in a population of cooperators who signal cooperation but 
fail to reciprocate. If there are no deterrents against cheating, it is in an individual's fit-
ness interests to obtain resources from others under the assumption of reciprocity and 
then to default, thus gaining resources at zero cost. "Social parasitism" of this sort has 
been observed among a variety of nonhuman animal species, and its ubiquity across 
species implies that it has had positive fitness consequences (Alcock, 2005). Cheating 
comes at a cost, however, so before deciding to default, the individual must weigh the 
costs and benefits of cooperating versus defaulting, as illustrated in the familiar prison-
er's dilemma of game theory (Axelrod, 1984). 
By cheating, each player in the game is behaving rationally-defined as a positive fit 
between ends and the means used to achieve them. However, cheating is only rational 
in circumstances oflimited interaction and communication. In the prisoner's dilemma 
game, the participants were acquaintances who might never see each other again and 
thus need not fear any repercussions arising from their cheating. Had they been broth-
ers, good friends, or members of a long-standing gang, they most likely would not have 
defaulted on their promise to cooperate, and each would have benefited rather than one 
benefitting at the expense of the other. Frequent interaction and communication breed 
trust among organisms with sufficient intelligence to recognize one another. Under 
such circumstances, cheating becomes less rational because cooperators remember and 
retaliate against those who have cheated them. Cheating ruins reputations, costs cheat· 
ers future cooperation, and can result in punishment, which is why most career 
criminals either die early or end up destitute (Shover, 1985). 
Cheats can only prosper in a population of unconditional altruists that game theO-
rists call suckers. Suckers are individuals who continue to extend benefits to 
who have cheated them. Any sucker genotype would soon be driven to ex:tinction 
cheats, leaving only cheats to interact with other cheats. Evolutionary logic predicts 
a population of cheats could not thrive any more than could a population of 
and selection for cooperation would occur rapidly (Machalek, 1996). Pure suckers 
cheats are thus unlikely to exist in large numbers in any social species. The vast 
ity of social animals, including human beings, are grudgers. Grudgers are sus:ceJ)uu .... 
to being cheated because they conform to the norms of mutual trust and 
and expect the same from others. But if cheated, they retaliate by not cooperating 
perpetrator in the future, and perhaps repaying the cheat in kind. Cheaters interact 
grudgers in a repeated game of prisoner's dilemma in which players adjust their 
gies according to their experience with other players. Cooperation rather than 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND CRIMINOLOGY 527 
becomes the rational strategy under such circumstances because each player reaps in 
the future what he or she has sown in the past (Roach & Pease, 2013) . 
As predicted by evolutionary logic, in computer simulations of interactions between 
populations of cheats, suckers, and grudgers, cheats are always driven to extinction 
(Allman, 1994). Yet we continue to see cheating behavior despite threats of exposure 
and retaliation. The problem with computer simulations is that players are constrained 
to operate within the same environment in which their reputations quickly become 
known. Real-life strategies are not automated binary strategies (cheat/don't cheat) based 
on the behavior of a laboratory opponent. Although computer simulations are inval-
uable for fleshing out the basic logic of evolutionary processes, we should not form an 
overly simplistic view of cooperating and cheating from them (Raine, 1993). Cheats are 
not constrained to remain in one environment in the real world; they can move from 
location to location, meeting and cheating a series of grudgers who are unaware of 
their reputation. This is exactly what many career criminals do. They move from place 
to place, job to job, relationship to relationship, leaving a trail of misery behind them 
before their reputation catches up to them (Ellis, 2005). Cheats are much more likely 
to prosper in large cities in modern societies than in small traditional communities in 
which, as in evolutionary environments, the threat of exposure and retaliation is great 
(Ellis & Walsh, 1997; Sampson & Laub, 2005). However, factors such as the stability of 
the group and cultural dynamics must also be considered. For instance, criminologists 
know that there are communities in which a "badass" reputation is valued by males 
more than anything else, but even in these communities there must be a certain level of 
group cooperation (Anderson, 1999). 
We have evolved psychological mechanisms that lead us to repay cooperation and 
defection in kind-any other strategy would be counterproductive. Among these mech-
anisms are the social emotions of empathy, guilt, shame, and the primary emotion of 
anger. Empathy moves us toward helping behavior, and shame and guilt preclude most 
of us from defecting in our social obligations and motivate us to engage in reparative 
behavior to restore our good name if we do so. Anger motivates us to retaliate if we are 
victimized by defection, and experiencing our anger may motivate the defector not to 
repeat. Punishing defectors is a valuable adaptive strategy as long as it does not exceed 
reasonable limits and is not imposed on unintentional defection because it is unlikely 
that cooperation would have evolved without it. As Buckholtz and Marois (2012) state, 
punishment "seems crucial for the evolutionary stability of cooperation and is the cor-
nerstone of modern models of criminal justice" (p. 655). 
THE SEX RATIO ISSUE: PARENTING VERSUS 
MATING EFFORT 
Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould (2010) claim that the issue of why always and every-
where males commit more crime than females is the "single most important fact that 
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criminology theories must be able to explain" (p. 299). Criminologists have been try-
ing to come to grips with the issue armed only with the theoretical tools of sociology. 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) have concluded that an explanation of sex differences 
in crime is "beyond the scope of any available set of empirical data" (p. 149). They 
mean, of course, any available data set from within the standard social science model, 
which attributes any behavioral or trait sex difference to socialization. The notion that 
the sex difference in criminal behavior is attributable to differential socialization is not 
even logically sustainable. If this were so, there would be some culture in some histori-
cal period in which female rates equaled, or even exceeded, male rates, but there is no 
such culture to be found (for a book-length treatment, see Walsh and Vaske, 2015). We 
maintain that the concept of mating versus parenting effort provides the only scientifi-
callyviable explanation at an ultimate level for sex differences in crime and that the only 
viable scientific explanation at a proximate level is sex differences in the neuroarchitec-
ture and neurochemistry forged by sexual selection (de Vries & Sodersten, 2009; Del 
Giudice, 2009; Pezeshki Rad eta!., 2014) . 
If everything in evolution, even survival, is subservient to reproductive success, we 
need to know how adaptive fitness traits are useful for either promoting or discouraging 
criminal activity. There are two ways that members of any animal species can maximize 
reproductive success: parenting effort and mating effort. Parenting effort is the propor-
tion of reproductive effort invested in rearing offspring, and mating effort is that propor-
tion allotted to acquiring sexual partners. Because acquiring sexual partners would have 
required overcoming the reticence of a careful female or vanquishing competitors vying 
for the same partner, traits such as aggression and a high need for status would be among 
those most useful. David Rowe (2002) provides a thumbnail sketch of some other traits 
useful to mating effort that can clearly be co-opted to support criminal behavior: 
A strong sexual drive and attraction to novelty of new sexual partners is clearly one 
component of mating effort. An ability to appear charming and superficially inter-
ested in women while courting them would be useful. The emotional attachment, 
however, must be an insincere one, to prevent emotional bonding to a girlfriend or 
spouse. The cad may be aggressive, to coerce sex from partly willing partners and to 
deter rival men. He feels little remorse about lying or cheating. Impulsivity could be 
advantageous in a cad because mating decisions must be make quickly and without 
prolonged deliberation; the unconscious aim is many partners, not a high-quality 
partner. (pp. 62-63) 
Probably almost all heterosexual males have falsely proclaimed love or used some other 
kind of mildly coercive/manipulative tactics in pursuit of sexual satisfaction, but most 
know to place limits on their behavior. Nevertheless, it is plain that high levels of the 
traits associated with mating effort coupled with the lack of constraint are serious risk 
factors for criminality. 
The reverse is also true-traits that facilitate parenting effort underlie other forms 
of prosocial activity: "Crime can be identified with the behaviors that tend to promote 
mating effort and noncrime with those that tend to promote parenting effort" (Rowe. 
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1996, p. 270 ). Because female reproductive success hinges more on parenting effort than 
on mating effort, females have evolved higher levels of the traits that facilitate it (e.g., 
empathy and altruism) and lower levels of traits unfavorable to it (e.g., aggressiveness) 
compared to males. Of course, both sexes engage in mating and parenting strategies, 
and both follow a mixed mating strategy. It is only claimed that mating behavior is far 
more typical of males and parenting effort is far more typical of females and that the 
traits underlying those strategies have been forged by eons of sexual selection pressures 
(Campbell, 2009) . 
Because humans are born more dependent than any other animal, parenting effort 
is particularly important, and we have thus evolved to invest heavily in parenting. 
However, there is considerable variation within the species. Gender constitutes the larg-
est division due to different levels of obligatory parental investment between the sexes. 
Female parental investment necessarily requires an enormous expenditure of time and 
energy, but the only obligatory investment of males is the time and energy spent copulat-
ing. Reproductive success for males increases in proportion to the number of females to 
whom they have sexual access, and thus males have an evolved propensity to seek mul-
tiple partners. 
Reproductive success among our ancestral females rested primarily on their abil-
ity to secure mates to assist them in raising offspring in exchange for exclusive sexual 
access, and thus human females evolved a much more discriminating attitude about 
sexual behavior (Geary, 2000; Nedelec & Beaver, 2012). The inherent conflict between 
the reckless and indiscriminate male mating strategy and the careful and discriminating 
female mating strategy drove the evolution of traits such as aggressiveness in males and 
the lowering levels (relative to female levels) of empathy and constraint that help males 
overcome both male competitors and female reluctance. It is important to remember, 
however, that although these traits were designed by natural and sexual selection to 
facilitate mating effort, they are also useful in gaining nonsexual resources via illegiti-
mate means (Quinsey, 2002; Walsh, 2006). 
Empirical research supports the notion that an excessive concentration on mating 
effort is linked to criminal behavior. A review of 51 studies relating number of sex part-
ners to criminal behavior found so of them to be positive, and in another review of 31 
studies, it was found that age of onset of sexual behavior was negatively related to crim-
inal behavior in all31 (Ellis & Walsh, 2000 ). A British cohort study found that the most 
antisocial1oo/o of males in the cohort fathered 27o/o of the children (Jaffee, Moffitt, Caspi, 
& Taylor, 2003), and anthropologists tell us that there are striking differences in behav-
ior between members of cultures that emphasize either parenting or mating strategies. 
Cultures emphasizing mating effort the world over exhibit behaviors (low-level parental 
care, hypermasculinity, and transient bonding) considered antisocial in Western societ-
ies (Ember & Ember, 1998). 
Molecular genetic studies have also found significant relationships between sexual 
behavior and criminal behavior. Beaver eta!. (2oo8) tested the evolutionary claim that 
the most antisocial males should have the most sex partners and found the same pol-
ymorphism of the dopamine transporter gene (DAT11o-repeat) that was significantly 
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related to both number of sexual partners and antisocial behavior. Another study found 
that males homozygous for the DATI polymorphism had significantly more sex part-
ners (an average of 5.66) compared to males who had only one or no copies (an average 
of 2.94), as well as significantly higher scores on delinquency and on other kinds of risky 
behaviors (Guo, Tong, & Cai, 2oo8). The 10-repeat allele of the DATI gene is exception-
ally efficient at clearing dopamine from the synaptic gap after it signals other neurons. 
Because dopamine gives us pleasure when we engage in activities such as sex, if it is 
cleared too fast, we are moved to seek more of the activity to get more pleasure (more 
dopamine). This constant seeking of activities to raise dopamine levels is the chemical 
basis of addiction to all sorts of things besides sex, such as drugs, smoking, food, gam-
bling, and alcohol (Walsh, Johnson, & Bolen, 2012). 
The fact that criminals are consistently found to have more sexual partners com-
pared to members of the general population is at odds with historical data, which indi-
cate that high-status males have always enjoyed greater reproductive success. Rosemary 
Hopcroft (2015a, 2015b) produces evidence from the National Longitudinal Study of 
Youth that greater reproductive success accrues to males who have achieved high sta-
tus (defined in terms of personal rather than household income) legitimately. It is the 
opposite for women, however: "Annual personal income is negatively correlated with 
number of offspring for women, and positively correlated with number of offspring for 
men'' (Hopcroft, 2015a, p. 148). She also provides evidence that high-status males today 
still enjoy greater copulatory opportunities, but in these times of effective birth contro~ 
this does not translate into the same high rate of reproductive success that it once did. 
Her findings, in conjunction with others from developed countries, suggest that "the 
demographic transition has attenuated, but not entirely broken, the link between social 
status and reproductive success in modern industrial societies" (2015a, p. 150). The 
same relationship between status and reproductive success obtains among criminals. 
"Badass" males in subcultures of violence are the big fish in that particular reproductive 
pool that attract women swimming in the same pool, even if they are low status in the 
legitimate pool. 
"STAYING ALIVE": FEAR AND EMPATHY 
..... .. .... ....... ......... ..... ........... .............. ..... .... ..... ... .... .......... .. ..... ... ..... ........ ..... ...... .. ... ..... .... .. .............. ......... ................... 
Anne Campbell's (1999) staying alive/low-fear hypothesis is an evolutionary approach to 
the gender ratio issue, and it has been described as "perhaps the best attempt to account 
for gender differences in criminality" (Roach & Pease, 2013, p. 66). Campbell's hypoth• 
esis features the selection pressures faced by ancestral females with regard to parental 
investment and status striving. The obligatory parental investment of females is enor· 
mously greater than that of males. Only after months of gestation and months or ye~ of 
lactation can a woman contemplate further children, which means that her reproductive 
success is far more tied to children she has than is that of a male. The greater ~epend~: 
of the infant on its mother renders a mother's presence more critical to offspnng surYl 
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and hence to the mother's reproductive success, than the presence of a father. In ancestral 
environments, the care of nursing infants meant that females always kept them in close 
proximity, and this posed an elevated risk of injury to the child as well as the mother if the 
mother placed herself in risky situations. Because female survival is critical to infant sur-
vival, it is critical to female reproductive success. Campbell therefore avers that females 
have evolved a propensity to avoid engaging in behaviors that pose survival risks. 
Campbell (2009) proposes that the evolved mechanism underlying this propensity 
is a physiology that responds to risky situations in ways that are subjectively experi-
enced as fear. There are essentially no sex differences in fearfulness across a number 
of contexts unless a situation contains a significant risk of physical injury. Greater fear 
responses account for the greater tendency of females to avoid potentially violent 
situations and also to employ indirect and low-risk strategies in competition and dis-
pute resolution relative to males. The most fearful ancestral females who avoided or 
removed themselves from situations containing a high risk of physical injury or death 
were those most likely to survive, and their survival increased the probability of the 
survival of their offspring and also the probability of the perpetuation of their genetic 
lineage. 
The staying alive/low-fear hypothesis also has implications for sex differences in sta-
tus seeking. Because males have greater variance in reproductive success compared to 
females but less parental certainty, they stand to gain greater fitness benefits by engaging 
in intrasexual competition for mating opportunities. High-status and dominant males 
always attract more females compared to low-status subservient males. Status and dom-
inance striving is often risky business, and because attaining status is less reproductively 
consequential for females than for males, there has been less pressure for the selection of 
mechanisms useful in that endeavor for females. In evolutionary environments, a male's 
reproductive success often rested on involving himself in risky situations in which high 
fear would have been a definite handicap. 
Campbell (1999) notes that there is female competition for mates, but it is mostly low 
key, low risk, and chronic as opposed to the high-key, high-risk, and acute nature of 
male competition. Females cannot compete for the assets most pertinent to attracting a 
committed mate, such as youth and beauty; a woman either possesses them or she does 
not. Male assets that attract females, unlike youth and beauty, can be achieved in com-
petition with other males. Males are generally willing to incur risks to achieve status and 
dominance to gain the resources that come with it, and thus potentially gain access to 
more females. 
Women do commit crimes, of course, but rarely do they involve risk of physical injury 
and are almost always committed for instrumental reasons. Campbell (1999) notes that 
although robbery and larceny/theft both involve expropriating resources from others, 
females constitute approximately 43% of arrests for larceny/theft and only approximately 
7% of arrests for robbery, a crime carrying a relatively high risk for personal injury. 
Campbell notes that although women do aggress and do steal, "they rarely do both at 
the same time because the equation of resources and status reflects a particularly mascu-
line logic" (p. 210 ). Robbery, and flaunting the material trappings signaling its successful 
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pursuit, is seen ultimately as a campaign for respect and status in the street culture from 
which most robbers come (Jacobs & Wright, 1999). Studies of female robbers provide 
no mention that female robbers crave the additional payoffs of dominance that male 
robbers do, or seek reputations as "hard-asses" (Messerschmidt, 1993). A woman with a 
reputation as a "hard-ass" would be most unattractive as a long-term partner. 
If pressed to boil down to a basic level the evolved traits that best account for the wide 
gender gap in criminal behavior, it would have to be the gender differences in empa-
thy and fear fashioned by the respective reproductive roles of the sexes. Empathy and 
fear are the natural enemies of crime for the obvious reasons stated by Walsh and Vaske 
(2015): 
Empathy is other oriented and prevents one from committing acts injurious tooth-
ers because one has an emotional and cognitive investment in the well-being of oth-
ers. Fear is self-oriented and prevents one from committing acts injurious to others 
out of fear of the consequences to one's self. Many other prosocial tendencies flow 
from these two basic foundations, such as a strong conscience, altruism, self-control, 
and agreeableness. (p. 168) 
MATING EFFORT AND 
THE AGE-CRIME CURVE 
.................................. ......... ................... ..... .... .................. .................. .... .. .... .......... ... ... .............. ... ... ........................... 
The age-crime curve has been described as "the most important regularity in crimi-
nology" (Nagin & Land, 1993, p. 330 ). The age-crime curve is the statistical count of 
the number ofknown criminal/delinquent offenses committed in a population during a 
given period and mapped according to age categories. The curve shows a sharp increase 
in offending beginning in early adolescence, a peak in mid-adolescence, a steep decline 
in early adulthood, followed by a steady decline thereafter. The peak may be higher or 
lower at different periods, and the peak age may vary by a year or two, but the peak 
remains. This pattern has been noted in all cultures for which statistics are gathered and 
at all times. Charles Goring noted the constancy of the age-crime curve across times 
and culture and concluded that it was "a law of nature" (as quoted in Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990, p. 124). 
Laws of nature describe regularities of nature; they do not explain why the regularities 
occur. As with the gender ratio issue, the age-crime curve has long puzzled criminolo· 
gists laboring under the illusion that biology is irrelevant for their discipline. HirSchl 
and Gottfredson (1983) have even stated that "the age distribution of crime cannot be 
accounted for by any variable or combination of variables currently available to crim· 
inology" (p. 554), and Shavit and Rattner (1988) write that the age peak in delinquency 
remains "unexplained by any known set of sociological variables" (p. 1457). To try to 
explain it, sociological criminologists often invoke peer influences, but they do not 
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inform us why these peer influences become more salient during adolescence and why 
these influences are typically antisocial. To do so, Spear (2013) states that an evolution-
ary perspective may be what we need: 
Common behavioral proclivities seen in human adolescents and their counterparts 
in other species include elevations in peer-directed social interactions along with 
occasional increases in fighting with parents, increases in novelty seeking, sensation 
seeking, and risk taking . .. . These across-species similarities support the suggestion 
that certain neurobehavioral characteristics of adolescence may be tethered in part 
by biological roots embedded in the evolutionary past. (p. SS) 
Mating effort entails a certain element of risk, and mating is particularly prevalent 
among adolescents and young adults (Ellis et al., 2012). Risky behavior among ado-
lescents is frequently pathologized, which is understandable when we witness them 
engaging in reckless driving, binge drinking, and drug-taking. However, these things 
are all evolutionarily novel acts, and the costs of engaging in them heavily outweigh 
the benefits, but we rarely pause to consider what may be evolutionarily adaptive about 
risk-taking per se during adolescence (Ellis et al., 2012). Studies of a number of primate 
species have shown that their adolescents share with human adolescents the tendency 
to become very sensitive to rewards, risk-taking, sensation-seeking, and novelty. From 
an evolutionary perspective, the purpose of these tendencies is to compel the animal 
to leave the nest to find a mate from another troop. Mid-adolescence and early adult-
hood is a period of intense competition among males for dominance and status among 
many primate species, including H. sapiens, aimed ultimately at securing more mating 
opportunities than the next male. As Martin Daly (1996) states, "There are many reasons 
to think that we've been designed to be maximally competitive and conflictual in young 
adulthood" (p. 193) . 
Puberty is initiated with the activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal axis, 
which dramatically increases the level of sex hormones signaling readiness for repro-
duction. At this time, many sex differences emerge' or increase as the genes turned on by 
hormones activate brain areas organized along sexually dimorphic lines in utero. Ernst, 
Pine, and Hardin (2006) explain that at a proximal level, risk-taking is the result of the 
developmentally normal lack of balance between brain areas associated with approach/ 
avoidance behaviors: "The propensity during adolescence for reward/novelty seeking 
in the face of uncertainly or potential harm might be explained by a strong reward sys-
tem (nucleus accumbens), a weak harm-avoidance system (amygdala), and/or an inef-
ficient supervisory system (medial/ventral prefrontal cortex)" (p. 299). Aaron White 
(2004) augments this with his summation of key messages from a New York Academy 
of Sciences neuroscience conference. The main points stressed are that much of ado-
lescent behavior is rooted in the lack of synchrony between a physically mature body 
and a still maturing nervous system. One of the consequences of this is that adolescents 
have higher sensitivity to reward, meaning that they require higher levels of stimula-
tion to obtain the same rewards as mature adults. This leads them to seek higher levels 
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of novelty and stimulation to achieve the same feeling of pleasure. In short, biological 
changes in the body and brain, intermingling with environmental factors, result in ado-
lescents being prone to risk-taking and experiencing wide emotional swings. 
Adolescence can be an emotionally trying time when both sexes are experiencing 
many physical and social changes. Males are juiced up by the huge pubertal surge of 
testosterone while at the same time experiencing profound changes in their neuro-
biology. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies show that adolescents have 
exaggerated nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activity relative to activity in regions of the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) compared to children and adults (Eshel, Nelson, Blair, Pine, 
& Ernst, 2007; Galvan et al., 2006). Because the NAcc is implicated in reward-seeking 
behaviors and the PFC is an inhibitor of impulse, findings such as these reveal mech-
anisms behind the adolescent propensity to favor short-term hedonism over more 
reasoned long-term goals. This suggests that adolescence is accompanied by changes 
in the ratios of excitatory to inhibitory neurotransmitters, fiber architecture, and tis-
sue composition; the excitatory transmitters dopamine and glutamate peak while the 
inhibitory transmitters y-aminobutyric acid and serotonin are reduced (Bava & Tapert, 
2010; Collins, 2004; Walker, 2002). The biological tools needed to increase novelty-
seeking, sensation-seeking, status-seeking, and competitiveness are adaptations forged 
by natural selection in the service of reproductive success (Bava & Tapert, 2010; Spear, 
2ooo; White, 2004). 
In addition to the previously mentioned chemical changes, the adolescent brain is 
also going through an intense period of tissue resculpting. It shows a decrease in gray 
matter in prefrontal regions as unused synapses are pruned, increased myelination of 
the PFC, and changes in the density and distribution of dopamine receptors in path-
ways that connect the limbic system to the PFC (Steinberg, 2005). The pubertal hormo-
nal surges prompt the increase of gene expression in the brain, and the genes then play 
their parts in slowly refining the neural circuitry to its adult form (Walker, 2002). Brain 
imaging studies reveal that the PFC (the modulator of emotions from the limbic system) 
undergoes a wave of synaptic overproduction just prior to puberty, which is followed 
by a period of pruning during adolescence and early adulthood (Giedd, 2004; Sowell. 
Thompson, & Toga, 2004). The selective retention and elimination of synapses relies 
crucially on experience-dependent input from the environment because the developing 
brain physically "captures" these inputs in somatic time the way that natural selection 
seizes on advantageous alleles in evolutionary.time. . 
Because the adolescent PFC is also less completely myelinated than the adult PFC 
(Sowell et al., 2004), there is a larger "time lapse" between the onset of an emotional event 
in the limbic system and a person's rational judgment of it in the PFC. Diffusion ten-
sor imaging studies demonstrate increasing fractional anisotropy (FA) and decreasing 
mean diffusivity (MD) as the brain matures from childhood to adulthood. FA is linked 
to increased axon myelination and is a scalar used to measure the integrity of white mat-
ter fiber (axons) tracts; the higher the FA, the greater the integrity of the connectivity 
between brain areas. MD is a measure reflecting water content and density throughout 
brain white matter. In short, increased FA and decreased MD indicate that the areas of 
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the brain such as the "rational" PFC and the "emotional" limbic system are better able to 
communicate with each other as the brain matures (Lebel & Beaulieu, 2011). 
These brain imaging studies show that there are physical reasons for the greater ratio 
of emotional to rational responses evidenced by teens. The physical immaturity of the 
adolescent brain combined with a "supercharged" physiology facilitates the tendency 
to assign faulty attributions to situations and the intentions of others, and this can lead 
to antisocial responses. In other words, "a brain on 'go slow' superimposed on a physi-
ology on 'fast forward' explains why many teenagers find it difficult to accurately gauge 
the meanings and intentions of others and to experience more stimuli as aversive during 
adolescence than they did as chi ldren and will do so when they are adults" (Walsh, 2002, 
p. 143). As Richard Restak (2001) states, "The immaturity of the adolescent's behavior is 
perfectly mirrored by the immaturity of the adolescent's brain" (p. 76). Although parents 
may decry such behavior, it is how natural selection has designed human adolescents to 
be prepared to leave the nest and produce the next generation. 
The human brain is evolution's masterpiece. It is the most complex and capable organ 
known. It is humanity's central processing unit and the great mediator to all human 
behavior. It processes the information we collect through our senses and makes sense 
of that information. Without such a complex brain, what it means to be human would 
be uninteresting; that is, the human condition would be nothing more than a monoto-
nous routine in survival. Instead, our complex brains give us art, science, and morality 
(Pinker, 2002) . Understanding the brain's structure, function, and evolutionary devel-
opment is paramount to a more complete understanding of criminal behavior. As such, 
evolutionary theory and neurocriminology add significant explanatory power to the 
criminologist's toolkit. Understanding brain development can help explain the age-
crime curve, but understanding abnormalities in brain structure and function can also 
help explain a variety of antisocial behaviors. Abnormalities in brain structures, such as 
the amygdala and PFC, and/or their functioning (e.g., metabolic activity) are routinely 
associated with violence, sex offenses, psychopathy, and addiction (Jorgensen & Barnes, 
2016; Raine, 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter argues for nothing more nor less than the evolution of criminology through 
the integration of the theories, methods, and technological instruments gifted to it by 
the more robust sciences. In their disciplines' adolescence, chemistry borrowed shame-
lessly from physics, biology from chemistry, and psychology from biology, and all pro-
gressed by leaps and bounds when they did so. To insist on trying to explain human 
behavior without an evolutionary framework is akin to modern chemistry going about 
its business ignoring the very causal foundations of the discipline-atoms and the other 
basic forces governing the behavior of matter- as it was once urged to do by many of its 
leading luminaries (Walsh, 1997). This does not imply the colonization of criminology; 
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criminologists can go about their work in their areas of expertise just as do biologists in 
their numerous areas of research without invoking evolution. However, biologists real-
ize that evolution draws all their sub-areas together because "nothing in biology makes 
sense except in the light of evolution;' as the grandfather of the neo-Darwinian synthesis 
of genetics and evolution, Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973, p. 125), maintained long ago. 
Darwin himself (1859) predicted that one day, "psychology will be based on a new foun-
dation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by grada-
tion. Much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history" (p. 428). Much the 
same claim could be made of any behavioral discipline, including criminology. 
An evolutionary approach can aid criminology in many ways in addition to provid-
ing the benefits outlined in this chapter. It can help explain why some people victimize 
others while simultaneously explaining why most of us do not. Another major benefit is 
that it can reconcile the tension between the two major criminological traditions whose 
assumptions about criminal behavior are radically at odds-social learning and social 
control theories (Pratt, Gau, & Franklin, 2011). The former views humans as naturally 
good (or at least a blank slate) until corrupted by bad neighborhoods, peers, families, 
and societies (how the sum of naturally good individuals equals bad groups is a ques-
tion never asked), whereas the latter views individuals as naturally selfish and requiring 
social controls to get them to respect the rights of others. For the social learning tradi-
tion, crime is an aberration, so it asks, "What causes crime?" The control tradition views 
crime as the default option in the absence of controls, and it asks, "Since crime is a way to 
acquire valued resources immediately and at minimal costs, why don't we all commit it?" 
The problem with this tension is each tradition's strictly dichotomized assumptions about 
human nature: It is either naturally good or naturally selfish (the social learning tradition's 
assumption is implicit rather than explicit, whereas the assumption of the control tradi-
tion is explicit). However, viewed through an evolutionary lens, this is a false dichotomy. 
Evolutionary criminology maintains that criminal behavior is normal and to be 
expected on a large scale when social cohesion breaks down, as the social control tra-
dition (exemplified by Durkheimian anomie, social disorganization, social bond, self-
control, and age-graded theories) avers. Evolutionary criminology also avers that the 
desire for peaceful coexistence by conforming to social norms and supporting their 
enforcement is also normal, as the social learning tradition maintains. Which of these 
features of human nature prevail-either at the social level or at the individual level-
depends on the coalescence of a large number of contingent factors because, as Aristotle 
stated many centuries ago, we have both beast and angel in our nature. Humans have a 
set of evolved motivations and regulatory mechanisms that they can display in reckless 
ways or in adherence to social norms. 
We have evolved to be reciprocal altruists who can realize our self-interests best by 
following rules than by not following them. The apparent paradox of social beings com-
mitting antisocial acts is resolved when we realize that our desire to cooperate with out 
fellows provides opportunities for non-cooperators to victimize us. The individuals most 
likely to do so are those who are disadvantaged in the competition for wealth, power, 
and status, which is what most mainstream criminological theories express. Adding 
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evolutionary explanatory concepts to criminology theories would not only enrich and 
broaden their repertoire of concepts but also ground them in the one existing theory that 
has the potential to add unity and coherence across all disciplines that study the behav-
ior of living things. Evolutionary theory highlights the types of environments in which 
the kinds of behaviors that trouble us most are likely to emerge, and it is the only extant 
meta-theory that is capable of uniting, integrating, and making sense of the disparate 
data on human behavior coming to us from many theories and many disciplines. 
In summary, it is worth noting that less than 100 years ago, biology, like criminol-
ogy today, was so fragmented that most biologists considered its unity "to be nearly an 
impossible task" (Smocovitis, 1992, p. 2). Biologists worried then about its autonomy 
as a science and about the intrusion of physics and chemistry into their discipline, just 
as many criminologists worry about the intrusion of biology today. Smocovitis quotes 
Joseph Woodger in his 1929 book Biological Principles on this fragmentation: 
If we make a general survey of biological science we find that it suffers from cleav-
ages unknown [in unified sciences such as chemistry]. Long ago it [chemistry] has 
undergone that inevitable process of sub-division into special branches which we 
find in other sciences, but in biology this has been accompanied by a characteris-
tic diversion of method and outlook between the exponents of the several branches 
which has tended to exaggerate their differences and has even led to certain tradi-
tional feuds between them ... [instead of a unified science we have] a medley of ad 
hoc hypotheses. (pp. 4-5) 
By substituting "criminology" for "biology" in the previous quotation, criminolo-
gists will recognize the present state of their disciple. Smocovitis (1992) concludes his 
history of the process from fragmentation to the paradigm shift inspired by the syn-
thesis of Darwinian natural selection and Mendelian genetics (neo-Darwinism) by 
stating, "What the architects had worked to construct [the unity of biology], had by 
1982 become a matter of fact" (p. 62). It will be a happy day when in the not too distant 
future another historian of science writes a similar conclusion with regard to the unity 
of criminology. 
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